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This article examines two moments of crisis at Canada’s border with the United States:
the aftermath of September 11th, 2001 (“9/11”) and the COVID-19 pandemic. The
Canadian government leveraged both crises to offshore responsibilities for asylum
seekers onto the United States. In the first case, Canada took advantage of U.S.
preoccupations with border security shortly after 9/11 to persuade the United States
to sign the Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement (“STCA”)—an agreement that
allows Canada to direct back asylum seekers who present themselves at land ports of
entry on the Canada-U.S. border. In the second case, Canada used heightened anxieties
about international travel during the COVID-19 pandemic to persuade the United States
to block irregular border crossings that asylum seekers were increasingly using to
circumvent the STCA. After reviewing Canada’s successful use of these moments of crisis
to persuade the United States to take on additional responsibilities for asylum seekers
for whom Canada would have otherwise been responsible, the article discusses a recent
Canadian Federal Court decision that may make all this political maneuvering moot. This
decision found that Canada cannot send asylum seekers back to the United States
without violating constitutional rights to life, liberty, and security of the person. Given
past practice, however, we can expect the Canadian government to continue to pursue
avenues to persuade the United States to take on additional responsibility for asylum
seekers—and moments of crisis will be important drivers for those efforts.
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INTRODUCTION
This article examines two moments of crisis at Canada’s land border with the United States: the
aftermath of 9/11 and the COVID-19 pandemic. The Canadian government leveraged both crises
to offshore responsibilities for asylum seekers onto the United States.
The primary legal instrument we will be examining with respect to both these crises is the
Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement (“STCA”). Under the terms of the STCA, subject to
limited exceptions, asylum seekers attempting to enter Canada from the United States via an official
land border port of entry are denied access to Canada’s refugee determination system and returned
to the United States (Government of Canada, 2002). The agreement works both ways—asylum
seekers who attempt to enter the United States from Canada at a land border crossing can also be
turned back to Canada (Government of Canada, 2002). The rationale behind this agreement is that
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asylum seekers are expected to claim refugee protection in the
first safe country they arrive in—currently, the United States
is the only country designated as a safe third country under
Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (S.C., 2001,
c. 27; Government of Canada, 2002). There is an important
limitation to the STCA: it does not apply to asylum seekers
who enter Canada “irregularly” by circumventing official ports of
entry along the land border. As such, asylum seekers who cross
into Canada irregularly cannot be returned to the United States
and are thus eligible to claim asylum in Canada (Government of
Canada, 2002; Smith, 2019).
The first crisis explored in this article—the terrorist attacks
on the World Trade Center in New York City on 9/11—
was a catalyst for the Canadian government to secure the
implementation of the STCA. The United States had long refused
to enter into such an agreement despite pressure from Canada,
knowing that it would significantly increase the number of
asylum seekers for whom the United States, rather than Canada,
was responsible. Eventually, the STCA’s ratification was a quid
pro quo: the United States accepted additional responsibility
for asylum seekers in return for Canada’s implementation of
enhanced security measures and greater collaboration along the
U.S.-Canada border, at a time when such measures were U.S.
priorities (US Department of State, 2002; Meyers, 2003; Macklin,
2005, p. 417). In addition, the Bush administration saw political
advantages to announcing the successful negotiation of the
STCA, which offered an occasion to contrast purportedly strong
U.S. border security measures with perceived vulnerabilities in
Canadian border control practices (Macklin, 2003, p. 16–17;
House of Representatives, 2002).
The second crisis analyzed in this paper—the current
COVID-19 global pandemic—was channeled by the Canadian
government to persuade the United States to block irregular
border crossings that asylum seekers were increasingly using
to circumvent the STCA. These irregular border crossings had
begun to pose political risks to Canada’s governing Liberal party:
the sudden influx of irregular crossings following the 2016 U.S.
presidential election garnered strong criticism from opposing
political parties and certain members of the Canadian public
(Vigil and Abidi, 2018, p. 55; Harris, 2019; Jansa et al., 2019).
Once again, a crisis presented an opportunity: when Canada
negotiated border closures with the United States during the
COVID-19 pandemic, the Trump administration was persuaded
to allow Canada to direct back to the United States asylum
seekers caught crossing the border irregularly, functioning as
a de facto expansion of the STCA (Government of Canada,
2020a; Russell, 2020). While this was ostensibly justified
on public health grounds, from the Canadian government’s
perspective the policy had little to do with protecting public
health. Rather, it aimed to address critiques raised by political
opponents about the Liberal party failing to stem the flow of
asylum seekers crossing the land border irregularly to avoid
the STCA (Hwang, 2017; Canadian Council for Refugees,
2020b).
In both cases, Canada successfully harnessed moments of
crisis to convince the United States to take on greater obligations
toward asylum seekers. It is ironic that what the Trump
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administration has attempted to achieve through overt antiimmigrant rhetoric and policies (i.e., “build a wall” against
asylum seekers), Canada achieved on its southern border through
less inflammatory but more calculating means. It is troubling that
Canada has managed to maintain an international reputation
for progressive immigration and refugee policies, while quietly
leveraging crises to establish interdiction agreements with the
United States that prevent asylum seekers from accessing refugee
protection in Canada.
A recent Canadian Federal Court of Canada decision,
however, may make all this political maneuvering moot (Federal
Court of Canada, 2020). This decision found that Canada
cannot send asylum seekers back to the United States without
violating constitutional rights to life, liberty, and security of
the person. Thus, the primary rationale for supporting the
STCA—namely, that the United States is a safe country for
asylum seekers—has now been invalidated by a Canadian court.
This makes the Canadian government’s underlying motivations
behind the agreement appear plain: to offload responsibility
for asylum seekers to the United States irrespective of whether
the United States is safe for asylum seekers. The Canadian
government has continued to pursue that agenda by appealing
the Federal Court decision, and by continuing to implement
the STCA and its de facto extension, pending the outcome of
that appeal. Moreover, regardless of the outcome of the appeal,
we can expect the Canadian government to continue pressuring
the United States to take on additional responsibility for asylum
seekers—and moments of crisis will be important drivers in
those efforts.

I: POST-9/11 U.S. SECURITY CONCERNS
AND THE STCA
For several years before the STCA was officially signed, Canada
had been pressing for an interdiction agreement with the
United States to manage the flow of asylum seekers (Macklin,
2005, p. 372–373). The United States consistently refused to enter
into such an agreement, as it would prevent thousands of asylum
seekers from leaving the United States for Canada each year, thus
significantly increasing the number of asylum seekers for whom
the United States is responsible. Consider that from 1995 to 2001,
60 to 70 percent of asylum seekers entering Canada came through
the United States first (394). Indeed, in 2001 alone, 13,000 asylum
seekers arrived in Canada from the United States, while only 200
traveled in the other direction (394–395).
Prior to 9/11, Canada made little progress in its efforts to
persuade the United States to close off this route for asylum
seekers. However, “the 9/11 attack gave [. . . ] that area a new
impetus” (Adelman, 2002, p. 27; Moore, 2007, p. 262; Settlage,
2012, p. 150). On October 29, 2001, George W. Bush directed
U.S. personnel “to begin harmonizing customs and immigration
policies with those of Canada as well as Mexico” (Adelman,
2002, p. 21). This led to negotiations between Canada and the
United States that culminated in the U.S.-Canada Smart Border
Action Plan (“Action Plan”), which sets out a 30-point plan for
collaboration, including coordination on refugee processing and
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the enactment of counter-terrorism legislation (US Department
of State, 2002).
President Bush and Prime Minister Jean Chrétien met at the
Ambassador Bridge in Detroit, Michigan in September 2002 to
provide a status report on the Action Plan, a discussion that
included the STCA and other collaborative security measures
between the United States and Canada (Meyers, 2003, p. 4). For
the United States, the STCA was a quid pro quo that secured
Canada’s agreement to the Action Plan (Macklin, 2005, p. 417;
Meyers, 2003). For Canada, the Action Plan represented an
opportunity to leverage U.S. security concerns related to border
security after 9/11 and the perceived security vulnerabilities of
Canada’s immigration regime, to convince the United States to
sign the STCA (Macklin, 2003, p. 16–17).
As the Action Plan was being negotiated, the rhetoric
surrounding security tended to overshadow Canada’s attempt to
offload responsibility for asylum seekers to the United States.
For example, consider Congressional testimony by Kelly Ryan,
then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration at the U.S. Department of
State. Ryan praised Canada’s eagerness to collaborate with the
United States on enhancing security measures, declaring that
“the United States and Canada share a common determination
to combat terrorism” and a “willingness to develop mutual
approaches to our common security.” The examples cited by
Ryan for Canada’s “tangible security improvements” included,
among others, advanced information sharing on international
air passengers, “integrated border enforcement teams” of
enforcement personnel, and sharing fingerprints and other
criminal record information (House of Representatives, 2002).
With overarching national security preoccupations in the
United States post-9/11, criticisms of Canada’s supposed lack
of border security were common. Ryan’s testimony is but one
example of the emphasis placed on Canada’s perceived lack of
border security in the fight against terrorism. Such rhetoric
directly tied terrorism to regulating the flow of asylum seekers,
showcasing that “the glue binding asylum seeker and terrorist
adheres just enough that invoking the former suffices to bring
the latter to mind” (Macklin, 2005, p. 410). Consider, for
example, the critiques of Canada for insecure borders and for
insufficient measures to prevent organized crime and terrorism,
in the Congressional testimony of Mark Krikorian, the Executive
Director of the Center for Immigration Studies (House of
Representatives, 2002):

to the United States, and that Canada provides more access to
public health care, legal aid, and other social assistance to asylum
seekers, thus further incentivizing individuals to claim asylum
(Macklin, 2005, p. 412). One would assume that Canada would
unequivocally reject critiques of its supposedly “lax” approach
to border control, especially considering that none of those
responsible for the 9/11 attacks entered the United States from
Canada (or were asylum seekers generally). However, instead of
actively combatting misinformation, Canada leaned into the link
between asylum seekers and terrorists, as doing so helped secure
an agreement they had been pursuing for years. As Macklin
(2003) explains, it was politically valuable for the United States to
place scrutiny on a perceived lack of security measures employed
by their neighbor to the North:
Even if US policy makers know that the Canadian refugee system
plays a minimal role in the presence of terrorists on US soil, it
may be worth the cost of adjudicating several thousand additional
asylum claims to reinforce the perception that the Canadian refugee
system is dangerously lax, and that the United States can and will
do a better job (18).

Whether real or imagined, these negative perceptions of Canada’s
border control regime in the aftermath of 9/11, and Canada’s tacit
encouragement of these perceptions, appear to have played a role
in finally persuading the US to agree to the STCA.

II: COVID-19, THE STCA AND CLOSING
UNOFFICIAL PORTS OF ENTRY
Long before COVID-19, the Canadian government faced
considerable pressure from political opponents to expand the
STCA to cover irregular border crossings (Jansa et al., 2019,
p. 38; Panetta, 2019). This was largely due to the belief that
asylum seekers crossing irregularly are “illegal” and “jumping
the queue” (Vigil and Abidi, 2018, p. 55; Harris, 2019). Despite
this being false—international law recognizes the right to seek
asylum and prohibits the imposition of penalties on asylum
seekers who travel irregularly—these anti-migrant sentiments
spread in Canadian political discourse and became a cornerstone
of Conservative election campaigns (Jansa et al., 2019, p. 38;
Canadian Council for Refugees, 2020a).
Opposition to asylum seekers who cross the border irregularly
increased following U.S. President Donald Trump’s 2016 election
win. In line with the anti-migrant and xenophobic rhetoric
touted during his campaign, Trump signed several executive
orders targeting migrants, including stripping certain groups of
Temporary Protected Status, and imposing a “Muslim Travel
Ban” (Jansa et al., 2019, p. 38). The results of anti-migrant
rhetoric and policies were felt along Canada’s border: in
December 2016, 1 month after the November 2016 U.S. election,
305 asylum seekers entered Quebec from the United States
irregularly; this was a 1,400% increase from December 2015
(Proctor, 2017, p. 2). The number of asylum seekers crossing
irregularly into Canada continued to increase in the following
years, with nearly 50,000 irregular border crossings recorded
between 2017 and 2019 (Smith, 2019). It is important to note

the United States has an important security interest in Canada’s
applying the safe third country proposal and incorporating it into
its own asylum system. According to the Canadian equivalent
of our asylum, more than 50 terrorist groups have established
themselves in Canada, partly because of a laxity of that country’s
asylum system. [. . . ] [I]deally, all applicants for asylum should
be detained until their cases are decided. So, sure, I would rather
have a potential terrorist [locked] up in New Jersey than working
in Manitoba.

This “laxity” referenced by Krikorian is based on the argument
that it is easier to become a refugee in Canada in comparison
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There is also reason to believe that closing off this route into
Canada may actually increase, rather than decrease, public health
risks in Canada. The experience with the STCA has taught us
that when the law was used to block paths into Canada at official
ports of entry, asylum seekers pursued other routes into the
country, including by crossing the border irregularly at unofficial
ports of entry like Roxham Road (Settlage, 2012, p. 171). Given
that asylum seekers attempting to avoid the STCA by crossing
the border irregularly will, during the COVID-19 pandemic,
be returned to the United States if they are caught crossing,
they have a strong incentive to make clandestine crossings into
Canada. That means crossing at remote and risky sites, perhaps
with the assistance of smugglers, and without health screenings or
quarantines. In other words: the Canadian government has taken
safe, well-monitored routes into Canada at places like Roxham
Road, and replaced them with unsafe, unmonitored routes that
may exacerbate public health risks during the pandemic.
While the public health rationale for closing off unofficial
ports of entry like Roxham Road seems decidedly weak, the
same cannot be said about the political justification. The Trudeau
government achieved a policy outcome that it had been pursuing
for years, and in so doing made a political headache go away:
the route that tens of thousands of asylum seekers have used
to enter Canada since Trump was elected has been blocked,
at least temporarily, and the Liberal government’s Conservative
opponents have been silenced.

that the vast majority of these crossings were not clandestine,
but rather were made at highly monitored “unofficial” ports
of entry, such as Roxham Road at the New York-Quebec
border, where the Canadian government has built border
infrastructure to process irregular border crossers seeking asylum
(Smith, 2019).
Critics suggested that this sudden influx in migration at
unofficial ports of entry was proof that Trudeau’s Liberal
government had “lost control of the border” and were being
soft on “illegal” migration, despite the legal and generally
orderly nature of the crossings (Panetta, 2019; Smith, 2019).
Given these mounting criticisms, the Liberal government had
an interest in expanding the STCA to unofficial ports of
entry. They also had an interest in doing so quietly to avoid
undermining efforts to present a progressive and pro-migrant
image, including through Trudeau’s highly publicized tweet
stating: “To those fleeing persecution, terror & war, Canadians
will welcome you, regardless of your faith. Diversity is our
strength #WelcomeToCanada” (Austen, 2017; Trudeau, 2017).
Canada, however, had little leverage in renegotiating the STCA
with the United States, given the Trump administration’s
reluctance to take on additional responsibility for asylum seekers
(Smith, 2019). Unsurprisingly, there was initially very little
movement on this front.
This changed quickly during the COVID-19 pandemic, which
presented an opportunity for the Canadian government to secure
an agreement that serves as a de facto expansion of the STCA,
justified ostensibly on public health grounds. The Canadian
government’s initial plan at the onset of the pandemic was
that asylum seekers who crossed the border irregularly would
be screened, sheltered, and isolated for 14 days (Government
of Canada, 2020b; The Canadian Press, 2020). However, on
March 20, 2020, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau reversed course,
announcing that asylum seekers crossing into Canada irregularly
would be denied entry and returned to the United States (Russell,
2020). This was implemented under Canadian law through a
series of Orders in Council (see e.g., Government of Canada,
2020a), which are instruments available to the executive branch
of the Canadian government that are enforceable without action
by the legislature—in this case authorized by the Quarantine Act
(S.C., 2005, c. 20). Trudeau stated that these emergency measures
would be lifted once it is safe to do so (The Canadian Press, 2020).
There is reason to be skeptical that this action was taken
solely to protect public health during the COVID-19 pandemic.
There are other measures that would effectively protect public
health without requiring the closure of the border to asylum
seekers. As the Canadian government initially proposed (The
Canadian Press, 2020), there could have been immediate health
checks at unofficial ports of entry and mandatory quarantines.
Such a strategy would be in line with the requirements imposed
on other travelers entering Canada, including those with less
“essential” reasons to travel to Canada (Rehaag, 2020). Yet,
despite little evidence that asylum seekers are any more likely
than other travelers to carry COVID-19 or to violate selfisolation measures, they were uniquely targeted (Hwang, 2017;
Canadian Council for Refugees, 2020b; Government of Canada,
2020a,b,c).
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CONCLUSION
The Canadian government’s proclivity to channel American
perceptions of the Canadian border as a threat to U.S. national
security—whether due to terrorism or pandemics—to convince
the United States to take on greater obligations toward asylum
seekers, is a lesson in diplomacy. It is worthy of note that
Canada achieved this under two Republican administrations
that both championed strict border enforcement and restricting
“illegal” immigration. Canada has not employed the blatant antiimmigrant rhetoric exemplified in the United States under the
Trump administration but has nonetheless “built a wall” against
asylum seekers through the STCA, and more recently during
the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the Canadian government
espouses progressive values, in practice, closed-door diplomacy
with respect to the interdiction of asylum seekers has undercut
these values and Canada’s international obligations.
Recently, the unconstitutionality of these tactics has been
recognized by the Federal Court of Canada, which in July
2020 issued a landmark decision invalidating the STCA (Federal
Court of Canada, 2020). In this decision, Justice McDonald
found that the United States is not safe for asylum seekers,
and that “. . . the risk of detention in the United States for the
sake of ‘administrative’ compliance with the provisions of the
STCA cannot be justified” (138). Based on evidence describing
inhumane conditions of detention, the use of detention as
a penalty against asylum seekers, and increased risks of
deportation to face persecution for detained asylum seekers
in the United States, the Federal Court found that directing
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back asylum seekers to the United States under the STCA
violates constitutional rights to life, liberty, and security of the
person (138–140).
The Federal Court suspended the effect of this decision
for 6 months, to provide the Canadian government with an
opportunity to appeal or to otherwise respond (163).
On August 21, 2020, Canadian Public Safety Minister Bill
Blair confirmed that the government filed an appeal of the
decision, citing legal and factual errors as a rationale for
the appeal (Tunney, 2020). This is perhaps not surprising. A
previous challenge to the constitutionality of the STCA when
the agreement was first implemented was successful in the
Federal Court, on the basis that, even then, the United States
was not safe for asylum seekers (Federal Court of Canada,
2007). However, the Canadian government successfully appealed
that decision on technical grounds, including that the parties
to the litigation lacked standing before the courts since none
of the parties had been directly turned away under the STCA
(Federal Court of Appeal, 2008). The more recent constitutional
case does not suffer from the same technical challenges, partly
because litigants were selected who were directly impacted by the
STCA and who thus clearly have standing. That means that any
appeal will need to address the substantive question of whether
the United States is safe for asylum seekers—in other words,
whether asylum seekers returned to the United States under the
STCA encounter circumstances where their rights to life, liberty,
and security of the person, as protected by section 7 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, are respected. Given
that these circumstances include deeply problematic conditions
of detention in the United States, as set out in the Federal Court’s
factual findings, we think it will be difficult for the Federal Court
of Appeal to overturn this decision. We therefore echo calls made
by others for the Canadian government to cease its appeal in

this matter, and to immediately suspend any removals under the
STCA (Canadian Council for Refugees, 2020a).
Despite these calls, given past practice, it is reasonable to
expect that the government will fully exhaust all appeals. While
the appeal slowly makes its way through the Court system, the
STCA, and the de facto extension of the agreement to unofficial
ports of entry will remain in effect. This means that these
“emergency” measures are likely to be in place for the duration
of the pandemic and potentially the current U.S. administration,
notwithstanding the constitutional problems identified by the
Federal Court.
Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it seems likely
that Canada’s efforts to convince the United States to take on
additional responsibilities for and act as a wall against asylum
seekers is not at an end. We can also anticipate that Canada will
attempt to leverage future crises in these efforts.
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